Now, I may be off base, but this seems like a bad thing to me. It also seemed like pretty stupid business. After all, it's not like certificates are hard to make (seriously -- I made three while writing the previous sentence). When your sole distinguishing feature is that people trust you, why would you ever mess with that trust?
In any case, the worst part of the whole thing was a suspicion that the practice didn't end with Trustwave; rather, that Trustwave was simply the CA that got caught. (No, this doesn't make it better. Don't even try that.)
But if that was the case, then who else was selling these man-in-the-middle 'skeleton' certificates? Who wasn't? Could I just call up and order one today, or would it be all dark parking lots and windowless vans, like the last time I bought an 0day from VUPEN? (Kidding. Sort of.)
The saddest part of the whole story is that out of all the major browser vendors, only one -- the Mozilla foundation, makers of Firefox -- was willing to take public action on the issue. This came in the form of a letter that Mozilla sent to each of the major CAs in the Mozilla root program:
Please reply by March 2, 2012, to confirm completion of the following actions or state when these actions will be completed.
1) Subordinate CAs chaining to CAs in Mozilla’s root program cannot be used for MITM or “traffic management” of domain names or IPs that the certificate holder does not legitimately own or control, regardless of whether it is in a closed and controlled environment or not. Please review all of the subordinate CAs that chain up to your root certificates in NSS to make sure that they cannot be used in this way. Any existing subordinate CAs that can be used for that purpose must be revoked and any corresponding HSMs destroyed as soon as possible, but no later than April 27, 2012.Which brings me to the point of this post. March 2 passed a long time ago. The results are mostly in. So what have we learned?
(Note: to read the linked spreadsheet, look at the column labeled "Action #1". If it contains an A, B, or E, that means the CA has claimed innocence -- it does not make SubCAs for signing MITM certificates, or else it does make SubCAs, but the holders are contractually-bound not to abuse them.* If there's a C or a D there, it means that the CA is working the problem and will have things sorted out soon.)
The high-level overview is that most of the Certificate Authorities claim innocence. They simply don't make SubCAs (now, anyway). If they do, they contractually require the holders not to use them for MITM eavesdropping. One hopes these contracts are enforceable. But on the surface, at least, things look ok.
There are a couple of exceptions: notably Verizon Business (in my hometown!), KEYNECTIS and GlobalSign. All three claim to have reasonable explanations, and are basically just requesting extensions so they can get their ducks in a row (KEYNECTIS is doing in-person inspections to make sure nothing funny is going on, which hopefully just means they're super-diligent, and not that they're picking up MITM boxes and throwing them in the trash.) **
But the upshot is that if we can believe this self-reported data, then Trustwave really was the outlier. They were the only people dumb enough to get into the business of selling SubCAs to their client for the purpose of intercepting TLS connections. Or at very least, the other players in this business knew it was a trap, and get themselves out long ago.
Anyone else believe this? I'd sure like to.
* 'Abuse' here means signing certificates for domains that you don't control. Yes, it's unclear how strong these contracts are, and if there's no possibility for abuse down the line. But we can only be so paranoid.
** I confess there some other aspects I don't quite follow here -- for example, why are some 'compliant' CAs marked with 'CP/CPS does not allow MITM usage', while others are 'In Progress' in making that change. I'm sure there's a good technical reason for this. Hopefully the end result is compliance all around.